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This paper reviews the recent empirical evidence on privatisation in developing 
countries, with particular emphasis on new areas of research such as the distributional 
impacts of privatisation. Overall, the literature now reflects a more cautious and nuanced 
evaluation of privatisation. Thus, private ownership alone is no longer argued to 
automatically generate economic gains in developing economies; pre-conditions 
(especially the regulatory infrastructure) and an appropriate process of privatisation are 
important to attain a positive impact. This includes well-designed and sequenced 
reforms; the implementation of complementary policies; the creation of regulatory 
capacity; attention to poverty and social impacts; and strong public communication: a 
list which is often challenging in developing countries. Even so, the studies do identify 
the scope for efficiency-enhancing privatisation which also promotes equity in developing 
countries.  
 
 
There is a large literature about the economic effects of privatisation. However, since it 
was mainly written in the 1990s, there was typically limited emphansis on issues which 
have come to the fore more recently, nor of more recent developments in the evidence 
about privatisation itself, much of it from developing economies. This motivated us to 
write this paper, which summarises the evidence about the impact of recent 
privatisations, not only in terms of firms’ efficiency but also with regard to the effects on 
income distribution. In addition, we are particularly attentive to the process of 
privatisation in developing countries, notably with respect to the regulatory apparatus 
enabling successful privatisation experiences.  
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When governments divested state-owned enterprises in developed economies, especially 
in the 1980s and 1990s, their objectives were usually to enhance economic efficiency by 
improving firm performance; to decrease government intervention and increase its 
revenue; and to introduce competition in monopolised sectors (Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988). Much of the earlier evidence about the economic impact of privatisation 
concerned these topics and was based on data from developed countries and later, 
transition countries. These findings have been brought together in two previous surveys, 
by Megginson and Netter (2001) and Estrin et al. (2009) respectively. The former 
assesses the findings of empirical research on the effects of privatisation up to 2000, 
mainly from developed and middle income countries while the latter concentrates on 
transition economies including China, over the 1989-2006 period.i However, the 
experiences from the wave of privatisations that have occurred in developing countries, 
before and since these studies, warrant a new examination of the impact of privatisation 
in the context of the development process. 
The tone of the privatisation debate has evolved in recent years in the international 
financial institutions, as privatisation activity has shifted towards developing economies 
and as a consequence of the difficulties of implementation and some privatisation 
failures in the 1980s and 1990s (Jomo, 2008). As a result, more emphasis in policy-
making is now being placed on creating the preconditions for successful privatisation. 
Thus, in place of a simple pro-privatisation bias characteristic of the Washington 
consensus (Boycko, Shleifer, Vishny, 1995), it is now proposed that governments should 
first provide a better regulatory and institutional framework, including a well-functioning 
capital market and the protection of consumer and employee rights. In other words, 
context matters: ownership reforms should be tailor-made for the national economic 
circumstances, with strategies for privatisation being adapted to local conditions.  The 
traditional privatisation objective of improving the efficiency of public enterprises also 
remains a major goal in developing countries, as does reducing the subsidies to state 
owned enterprises (SOEs). 
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This article therefore reviews the recent evidence on privatisation, with emphasis on 
developing countries. The first section presents some stylized facts. The second 
examines the effects of privatisation in terms of firms’ efficiency and performance. In 
section three, we go on to examine the distributional impacts of privatisation. Policy 
recommendations are developed in the final section. 
 
Privatisation trends: stylized facts 
Privatisation trends since the late 1980s. The data on privatization prior to 2008 
(with a regional breakdown) is sourced from the World Bank Privatization database but 
unfortunately this was discontinued in 2008 and no consolidated data is available after 
that date. Since we have not been able to find disaggregated data post-2008, we 
therefore present world aggregates, based on the Privatization Barometer database. 
The early literature focused on developed economies and Western Europe represented 
roughly a third of global privatisation proceeds over the period 1977 to 2002 (Roland, 
2008).  Even so, many of these deals only concerned minority stakes of state-owned 
firms (SOEs) (Bortolotti and Milella, 2008). There were also spectacular numbers of 
privatisations during the transition process after 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe, 
with proceeds totalling US$240bns to 2008, in addition to widespread free or subsidised 
allocation of shares in former SOEs (Estrin et al., 2009). The revenues from privatisation 
have been more limited in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, with total proceeds 
below US$50bns for eachii (See Figure 1). However, they are on par or above Europe 
once they are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
For the rest of Asis, the picture is rather different. While South Asia has experienced only 
a limited number of privatisations (especially India), this was not the case in East Asia 
where total privatisation proceeds represented 30% of total world (US$230bns) over the 
1988-2008 period. China, in particular, stands out. Over a 25-year period, the Chinese 
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government has encouraged innovative forms of industrial ownership, especially at the 
subnational level, that combine elements of collective and private property (Brandt and 
Rawski, 2008). New private entry and foreign direct investment have also been 
encouraged. As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the non-state sector accounted for 
over 60% of GDP and state enterprises’ share in industrial output had declined from 
78% in 1978 to 28% in 1999 (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004). The OECD estimated the state-
owned share of GDP had further declined to 29.7% by 2006 (Lee, 2009). 
Finally, in Latin America and especially in Chile, large-scale privatisation programs have 
been launched, especially in the infrastructure sector, starting in 1974 in Chile and 
peaking in the 1990s. Between 1988 and 2008, the total privatisation proceeds in Latin 
America amounted to US$220bns (28% of total world proceeds).  
Figure 1: Value of privatisation transactions in developing 
countries by region, 1988–08 
 
Source: World Bank, Privatisation database. Note: comparable data not available after 2008. 
 
One needs to be cautious, however, when interpreting the raw data because of 
differences in the size of economies.  The differences between the privatisation 
experience of Africa, Asia and Europe become less striking when proceeds are 
normalised by GDP, though privatisation revenue to GDP is high in Latin America, 
representing on average 0.5% of GDP over the period. 
Privatisation trends since 2008iii. The five years to 2015 have been marked by the 
predominant role of China in global privatisations, while the EU’s share has been below 
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its long-term average of 45% of total world’s proceeds, running at only a third of 
worldwide totals on average.  
According to the Privatisation Barometer (PB) Report 2013-2014, global privatisation 
total proceeds exceeded US$1.1 trillion from January 2009 to November 2014, with 
US$544 billion divested assets between January 2012 and November 2014. In addition, 
the 20-month period beginning in January 2014 witnessed privatisations totalling $431.4 
billion (PB report 2015). This is far more than any comparable period since the beginning 
of the privatisation programs in the U.K. in the late 1970s (see Figure 2), though as 
noted below, a significant part of this was driven by the unwinding of positions taken in 
banks by governments during the financial crisis. 
Figure 2: Worldwide privatisation revenues 1988-2015 (USD bn) 
 
Note: 2015 is an estimate as of 30/08/2015. Source: Privatisation Barometer website. 
 
China has consistently been one of the top privatisers 2009-15, being the second largest 
privatiser in 2009 and the first in 2013, 2014 and the 8-month period January-August 
2015.  Aggregate privatisation deals in China totalled more than US$40 billion in both 
2013 and 2014 and a spectacular $133.3 billion in the first eight months of 2015 through 
247 sales. The bulk of these privatisation revenues came from the public and private 
placement offering of primary shares by SOEs (PB report, 2015). However, the state’s 
equity ownership stake was generally only reduced indirectly, by increasing the total 
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number of shares outstanding (PB report, 2015). In fact, Hsieh and Song (2015) have 
shown that almost half of the state-owned firms in 2007 and nearly 60 percent of them 
in 2012 were legally registered as private firms. The term used in China for this 
ownership change is that the large state-owned firms are “corporatized” rather than 
privatised. The typical form this “corporatization” takes is that of a minority share traded 
in the stock market and merged into a large state-owned conglomerate, the controlling 
shareholder (Hsieh and Song, 2015). 
The next leading country in terms of privatisation proceeds after China is the U.K., but it 
is far behind, with total proceeds of US$17.2 billion in 2014 (against US$7.8bns in 
2009).  
In the EU as a whole, with countries addressing their government deficits post-2008, 
privatisation proceeds rose to a five-year peak in 2013, to $68.0 billion and a nine-year 
peak of $77.6 billion in 2014, while the annualized value of privatisations during 2015 – 
based on the first 8 months- reached $63.3 billion. This represents more than a third of 
the global annual totals in 2014, but it is only 20.0% of worldwide totals in the first 8 
months of 2015 and lower than the long-run average EU share of about 44.6% (PB 
report, 2015). This relative decline of EU privatisation proceeds is also reflected in the 
fact that China alone generated revenues from privatizsation almost as great as did the 
EU countries combined during 2015 ($68.0 billion versus $77.6 billion for China) (PB 
report, 2015).  
China and India were the two top emerging countries by total privatisation revenues in 
2015. The five largest single deals outside the developed world in 2014 were realized in 
China, with the recapitalization and primary share offering of CITIC Pacific Ltd, the 
private placement of BOE Technology Group, the primary-share IPO of Dalian Wanda 
Commercial, and finally the primary-share IPO of CGN Power and of HK Electrical 
Investments Ltd. 
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In the following section, we focus on the privatisation experience in Africa and South 
Asia. While the privatisation programs in Eastern Europe, China and Latin America are 
among the most important in terms of total proceeds, a rich literature already exists 
discussing them (see Estrin et al. (2009) on transition economies and Estache and 
Trujillo (2008) on Latin America). Moreover, while privatisation in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe culminated in the 1990s, much privatisation in Africa and South Asia is 
more recent (Roland, 2008). 
 
Privatisation patterns in Africa: a few countries only 
Privatisation programs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) occurred in successive waves, with 
some countries privatising much earlier than others (Bennell, 1997). The first group to 
start such programs, in the late 1970s to early 1980s, was composed of francophone 
West African countries (Benin, Guinea, Niger, Senegal and Togo) but their progress was 
limited. The second group, both Anglophone and Francophone countries (Ghana, Nigeria, 
Ivory Coast, Mali, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar and Uganda), started 
privatising in the late 1980s. These programs were often influenced by pressure from the 
international financial institutions (Nellis, 2008) though, as noted by Bennell (1997), no 
significant progress was made anywhere except Nigeria until the late 1990s. The final 
group, the “late starters”, did not begin to privatise until the early to mid-1990s. Among 
this group, Tanzania, Burkina Faso and Zambia have shown a strong political 
commitment to privatisation, whereas in the other three countries (Cameroon, Ethiopia 
and Sierra Leone), only minimal progress was made in the 1990s. 
Privatisation in the 1990s; a slow start. Only a minority of SOEs in SSA were subject 
to privatisation over the period 1991-2001 and very little privatisation has taken place 
outside of South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire (Nellis, 2008). African 
states have privatised a smaller percentage (around 40%) of their SOEs than in Latin 
America and the transition economies (Nellis, 2008). In addition, privatisation has 
generally concerned smaller manufacturing, industrial or service firms. Bennell (1997) 
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also reports that smaller SOEs were usually targeted during the initial stages of 
privatisation programs in SSA because they were easier to sell. Five industries in 
particular were prominent in most programs: food processing, alcoholic beverages, 
textiles, cement and other non-metallic products, and metal products. These industries 
accounted for 60% of the total proceeds from the sale of manufacturing SOEs during 
1988-1995 (Bennell, 1997), if we exclude the exceptional large sale of ISCOR (Iron and 
Steel Industrial Corporation) in South Africa. 
Bennell (1997) explains that the slow progress in privatisation in the 1990s was due to a 
lack of political commitment compounded by strong opposition from entrenched vested 
interests (senior bureaucrats in ministries and SOEs themselves, as well as public sector 
workers concerned about their job security). For instance, in Cameroon, only five of the 
thirty SOEs scheduled for privatisation were sold by the end of 1995. In other countries, 
such as Nigeria, the privatisation program started well but then stalled. Despite the fact 
that Nigeria’s program had been one of the most successful in SSA in the 1990s, it was 
suspended in early 1995 in favour of a mass program of “commercialization”. In 
Madagascar, the privatisation program was also suspended in mid-1993 due to serious 
mismanagement and its unpopularity. In addition, Bennell (1997) reports that there 
were nationalist concerns about the possible political and economic consequences of 
increased foreign ownership as a result of privatisation. 
However, in the late 1990s, certain political constraints lifted. First, a growing number of 
governments in SSA started to undertake significant economic reforms, under the aegis 
of the World Bank and the IMF, in which privatisation was an integral part. Reforms and 
privatisation were also progressively being accepted by the population. In addition, 
important political liberalization, with multi-party elections, broke with the previous 
statist policies, and created some room for manoeuvre to implement privatisation 
programs. Finally, the weak financial position of SOEs in many SSA countries and their 
rapid deterioration, in conjunction with the fiscal crisis of the state experienced in the 
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1990s, also opened the way for a sell-off of SOEs to raise government revenues and 
reduce expenditures. 
Despite this stronger commitment, Nellis (2008) notes that there were actually only a 
few privatisation deals in Africa in the 1990s, mainly in infrastructure, and even in these 
the state retained significant minority stakes; around one third of the shares on average 
being retained. Between 1988 and 1999, the total proceeds from privatisation in SSA 
amounted to US$9.8bns, with the manufacturing and services sector accounting for 36% 
of the total, infrastructure 28%, the energy sector 17%, the primary sector 14% and the 
financial (and other) sector 6% (Source: World Bank Privatisation Database). 
The early to mid-2000s; more rapid progress. There were some important 
privatisations in SSA between 2000 and 2008, and total proceeds increased to 
US$12.654 bns (World Bank Privatisation Database). Nigeria comprised 51% of this 
amount, followed by Kenya (10%), Ghana (9%) and South Africa (6%). Infrastructureiv 
represented 73% of the total amount of the deals, followed by the manufacturing and 
services sectorv (17%), the financial sectorvi (6%), energyvii (4%) and the primary 
sectorviii (1%) (Source: World Bank Privatisation Database).  
Privatisation post-2008; a slowdown. Privatisation activity slowed in SSA 
with the economic downturn after 2008. One notable exception was Benin, with the 
privatisation of the cotton and the public utility sectors. The concession for the operation 
of the container terminal of the Port of Cotonou and the majority stake in the cement 
company were awarded to a strategic private investor in September 2009 and March 
2010, respectively, and the privatisation of Benin Telecom was launched in 2009 (still 
ongoing) (IMF Country Report No. 10/195). Nigeria was also notable for its sale of 15 
electricity generating and distribution companies in 2013, raising US$2.50bns (Source: 
Privatisation Barometer 2014). In Chad, the government announced in 2015 that it was 
re-launching the sale of 80% of Société des Telecommunications du Tchad (Sotel-
Tchad), after the previous attempt collapsed in 2010. Because the World Bank 
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Privatisation Database does not have data on privatisation after 2008, one cannot 
compare the aggregated privatisation proceeds post-2008 to those of earlier decades.  
Privatisation in South Asia: a slow opening  
Privatisations in South Asia have traditionally been rare, despite the notable inefficiency 
of SOEs (Gupta, 2008). The governments’ reluctance to privatise can be partly explained 
historically, with the government’s close involvement in the establishment of an 
industrial base in the postcolonial era, especially in India (Gupta, 2008). Particular 
sectors had been reserved exclusively for government-owned firms (SOEs), such as the 
infrastructure sector and capital goods and raw materials industries such as steel, 
petroleum and heavy machinery. In addition, the government nationalized many loss-
making private companies; more than half of the firms owned by the Indian federal 
government were loss-making in the 1990s.  
Figure 3: Indian Revenues from Privatisation 
 
Source: World Bank Privatisation database. 
 
Following the balance of payment crisis of 1991, the Indian government implemented a 
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privatisation and strategic sales. However, the former was very limited, with the 
government selling only minority equity stakes until 2000, and without transferring 
management control. Political uncertainty prevented the emergence of a coherent 
privatisation policy. Majority stakes sales and the transfer of management control were 
only conducted after the elections of 1999, and even then, until 2004 the government 
retained an average ownership stake of 82% in all SOEs (Gupta, 2008).  
The stalled privatisation program was revived in 2010 with a secondary offering of 
shares in National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd (NTPC), which owns 20% of India’s 
power generation capacity (Privatisation Barometer 2009). However, the sale of the 
US$1.85bns block of shares only reduced the government’s stake by an additional 5%, 
leaving 85% still under government control. In addition, the process of privatisation was 
viewed as poor, with the secondary offering subscribed only 1.2 times, and even this 
after assistance from government-owned financial institutions.  
In summary, between 2000 and 2008, the proceeds of privatisation in South Asia 
totalled US$ 17.45 bns, the bulk being realized in India (55%) followed by Pakistan 
(43%). Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka provided the remaining 2% 
(Source: World Bank Privatisation Database). Between 2000 and 2008, the infrastructure 
sector represented 51% of the proceeds, followed by the energy sector (26%), the 
financial sector (12%), manufacturing and services (10%) and the primary sector (2%) 
(Source: World Bank Privatisation Database).  
 
The effects of privatisation: efficiency and firm 
performance 
Overall, as we report below, the studies on developing economies show that a move 
from state to private ownership alone does not automatically yield economic gains. 
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Rather, a number of factors have been found to influence the success of privatisation, 
namely: 
• Which firms are privatised; there can be a positive (or negative) selection effect. 
• Whether privatisation is total or partial; evidence suggests that the former is more 
beneficial.  
• The regulatory framework, which in turn depends on the institutional and political 
environment.  
• The characteristics of the new owners; foreign ownership has been associated with 
superior business performance post-privatisation, especially relative to “insider” 
ownership (privatisation to managers and workersix).  
• Effective competition. This has been found to be critical in bringing about 
improvements in company performance because it is associated with lower costs, 
lower prices and higher operating efficiencyx.  
In the following sub-sections, we introduce the estimation techniques that have been 
used to measure the impact of privatisation on firms’ performance and then examine 
privatisation experiences in three sectors (banking, telecommunications and utilities) in 
developing countries. We also provide an analsysis of the robustness of the evidence in 
the literature about the impact of privatisation. 
 
Measuring efficiency and firms’ performance post-privatisation 
As Megginson and Sutter (2006) note, researchers face numerous methodological 
problems when they analyse the economic effects of privatisation. In particular, data 
availability and consistency, especially in developing countries, and sample selection bias 
–occurring, for example if the “best” firms are privatised first- represent key issues. 
Other problems arise when using accounting data: the determination of the correct 
measure of operating performance, the selection of an appropriate benchmark and 
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statistical tests are important challenges. These issues are germane to the interpretation 
of the results of the studies surveyed below.  
A variety of methods have been used to measure the impact of privatisation on firms’ 
post-privatisation performance and efficiency, measured in a number of ways including 
return on equity, output growth, labour productivity and changes in cost and income. We 
distinguish between two different empirical approaches. The first one consists in 
comparing the performance of government-owned firms to that of privately-owned firms. 
The second one consists in comparing pre-and post-divestment performance for 
companies privatised via share issues (public offerings) [MNR methodology]. 
Comparing government-owned firms to privately-owned firms. 
An obvious way to examine the impact of privatization is to compare the performance of 
government-owned to privately-owned firms. Studies in this tradition Compare post-
privatisation performance changes with either a comparison group of non-privatised 
firms or with a counterfactual. However, important methodological issues arise, 
especially in the earlier studies. First, it is difficult to determine the appropriate set of 
comparison firms, especially in developing countries where the private sector is limited. 
Second, selection effects and endogeneity may bias the comparison, as factors 
determining whether the firm is publicly or privately owned are also likely to affect 
performance (Gupta, Ham, Svejnar, 2008).  
Single country or single industry comparisons of costs and productivity growth of private 
and government-owned firms. 
One of the first studies to compare SOE and private firm performance is that of Ehrlich, 
Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, and Lutter (1994). They used a sample of 23 comparable 
international airlines (18 from developed countries and 5 from developing/emerging 
countries) of different ownership categories over the period 1973-1983 for which they 
have data on cost and output for comparable goods. They find a significant association 
between ownership and firm-specific rates of productivity growth. Interestingly, the 
empirics also suggest that the benefits derive primarily from complete privatisation of 
the firm, and that a partial change from state to private ownership has little effect on 
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long-run productivity growth. Other studies have employed a similar approach examining 
differences in efficiency between private and government-owned firms within a specific 
country, such as Majumdar (1996) for Indian firms and Tian (2000) with Chinese firms. 
They both find that private-sector firms are more efficient. However, these results are 
not highly robust from the perspective of contemporary methods, as they do not directly 
address selection issues. 
Concerning studies using a counterfactual approach, one can cite the influential study by 
Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1994), which was sponsored by the World Bank. 
They compare the actual post-privatisation performance of twelve large firms in the 
airlines and utilities industry in Britain, Chile, Malaysia and Mexico to a counterfactual 
performance. They estimate net welfare gains in eleven of the twelve cases considered, 
equalling on average 26 percent of the firms’ pre-divestiture sales. La Porta and Lopez-
de-Silanes (1999) study privatisation in Mexico and find that privatised Mexican SOEs 
rapidly close a large performance gap with industry-matched private firms that had 
existed prior to divestment. They find that output increases by over 50% and that the 
privatised firms reduce employment by half, while the remaining workers see a 
significant pay rise.  
Cross-country, multi-industry comparisons of X-efficiency and profitability ratio of private 
and government-owned firms. 
Another approach has been to exploit a multi-industry, multi-national cross-sectional 
time series to analyse the effects of government ownership on efficiency. The advantage 
of this method is that it captures differences that are not apparent in single-country or 
single-industry series, and the results are therefore methodologically more soundly 
based. In their seminal work, Boardman and Vining (1989) use measures of X-efficiency 
and profitability ratios of the 500 largest non-US manufacturing and mining corporations 
in 1983 (“The International 500”, Fortune 1983). Privately owned firms are found to be 
significantly more profitable and productive than state-owned and mixed ownership 
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enterprises but mixed enterprises are no more profitable than SOEs. Another important 
study is that of Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999), which compares the 
performance of privatised and state firms in the transition economies of Central Europe 
in 1994 using a fixed effects model. To control for the possibility that better firms are 
selected for privatisation, they compare the pre-privatisation performance of 
managerially controlled firms with those controlled by other owners. They find that 
privatised firms perform better than the state-owned firms but that the performance 
improvement is related to revenue improvement rather than cost reduction in privatised 
firms.  
As we noted, governments sequence privatisations strategically, often leading the most 
profitable firms to be privatised first (Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2008; Dinc and Gupta, 
2011). To control for selection and endogeneity biases, the latest studies have employed 
more advanced econometric techniques including differences in difference, triple 
differences matching methods and instrumental variable methods.  
For instance, Dinc and Gupta (2011) examine the influence of political and financial 
factors on the decision to privatise government-owned firms in India using data from the 
1990-2004 period. They find that profitable firms and firms with a lower wage bill are 
likely to be privatised early and that the government delays privatisation in regions 
where the governing party faces more competition from opposition parties. The results 
therefore suggest that firms’ financial characteristics have a significant impact on the 
government’s decision to privatise. This raises an identification issue for evaluating the 
effect of privatisation on firm performance: if more profitable firms are more likely to be 
privatised, we may overstate the impact of privatisation on profitability when we 
compare the performance of government-owned to that of privatised firms.  The authors 
then proceed to use political variables as instruments for the privatisation decision, 
adopting a two-stage least squares treatment effects regression. After addressing the 
selection bias, they find that privatisation still has a positive impact on performance in 
India. 
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Comparing pre-post divestment sales and income data for companies privatised 
by public share offering 
This set of studies examines the effects of privatisation on firm performance by 
comparing pre- and post-divestment data for companies privatised via public share 
offerings. Each firm is compared to itself (a few years earlier) using inflation-adjusted 
sales and income data. The first study using this methodology is by Megginson, Nash 
and van Randenborgh (1994) (henceforth, the MNR methodology). As Megginson and 
Netter (2001) note, this methodology suffers from several drawbacks, among which 
selection bias is probably the greatest concern, since privatisations through share sales - 
SIPs (Share Issue Privatisation) - represent among the largest companies sold during a 
privatisation program. Another weakness is that the MNR methodology can only examine 
simple accounting variables (assets, sales, etc.), which is an issue when comparing 
accounting information at different points in time and in different countries. Most of the 
studies in this tradition also imperfectly account for macroeconomic or industry changes 
in the pre- and post-privatisation window (see Megginson and Netter, 2001, for a 
critique). These studies also cannot account for the impact on privatised firms of 
regulatory or market-opening initiatives that are often launched in parallel with 
privatisation programs. However, the MNR methodology allows the analysis of large 
samples of firms from different industries, countries and time periods and, while carrying 
the risk of selection bias, SIP samples contain the largest and most (politically) 
important privatisations. 
Most of these studies do identify a significant improvement in company performance, 
post-privatisation, though methodological reservations remain. Research in this tradition 
has focused on specific industries [banking (Verbrugge, Owens and Megginson, 2000) 
and tele-communications (D'Souza and Megginson, 2000)]; used data from a single 
country [Chile (Macquieira and Zurita, 1996)] and employed multi-industry, 
multinational samples. However, the significance of many of the operating and financial 
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improvements is not robust to adjustments for changes experienced by other firms over 
the study period.  
A very recent work by Li, Megginson, Shen and Sun (2016) overcomes the empirical 
limitations of the previous SIPs studies mentioned above by employing a triple difference 
approach. The authors are able to separate the pure privatisation effect from the listing 
effect, using a database of 204 Chinese SIPs from 1999-2009 matched with otherwise 
comparable state-owned enterprises and privately-owned firms. The first double-
difference compares the performance change of SIP firms before and after listing with 
the performance change of a control group of fully state-owned and unlisted SOEs to 
capture the combined “SIP effect” of going public and privatising. The second double-
difference compares the performance change of privately-owned firms before and after 
their listing with the performance change of a control group of privately-owned firms 
that remain unlisted. This captures the “pure listing effect”. They obtain the “pure 
privatisation effect” by taking the difference between these two double differences. 
Interestingly they continue to find a positive impact from privatisation using this 
exacting methodology: they find a significant positive increase in profitability post-SIP in 
divested Chinese state-owned companies, even after the negative IPO listing effect is 
taken into account.  
 
Empirical evidence to date in developing countries 
In this section, we summarise the empirical evidence to date about the effects of 
privatisation on firms’ performance and efficiency in developing countries, drawing on 
the discussion of methodology outlined above. The sectors covered include banking, 
telecommunications and utilities. To examine the reliability of the evidence in drawing 
policy conclusions, we go on classify the papers reviewed into four categories depending 
on the quality of the sample and the robustness of the methods used. 
The banking sector 
The studies reviewed by Clarke, Cull and Shirley (2005), focusing on developing 
countries and employing the MNR methodology or a stochastic frontier approach, find 
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that bank performance usually improved after privatisation. For instance, Boubakri et al. 
(2005), applying the MNR methodology to analyse 81 bank privatisations in 22 low- and 
middle-income countries, find that some measures of performance improved after 
privatisation, but that this pattern was not common across countries; environmental 
factors also played a role. The study of Beck, Cull and Jerome (2005) in Nigeria shows 
that privatisation can improve bank performance, even when the macroeconomic and 
regulatory environment is inhospitable and the government sells the weakest banks. 
However, it argues that an adverse macroeconomic and regulatory environment reduces 
the benefits of privatisation.xi Azam, Biais and Dia (2004) also show how both 
theoretically and empirically the benefits of a strong, independent regulatory agency to 
ensure that privatised banks play an efficient role in financial development. 
The studies surveyed by Clarke et al. (2005) also find that privatisation of banks has a 
greater positive effect when it is total rather than partial. This result has been found in 
transition countries (Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005) as well as in Brazil (Beck, Crivelli 
and Summerhill, 2005) and in Nigeria (Beck, Cull and Jerome, 2005)xii. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that privatisation boosts competition in the banking sector. For 
instance, Otchere (2005) examines share-issue privatisations in nine countries using the 
MNR methodology and finds that rival banks suffered abnormally negative returns 
following privatisation announcements, which suggests that shareholders expected more 
intense competition and lower returns.  
Thus, evidence suggests that performance improves more when the government fully 
relinquishes control; when banks are privatised to strategic investors rather than 
through share issues; and when bidding is open to all, including foreign banks (Clarke et 
al., 2005; Megginson, 2005). A more recent paper by Clarke, Cull and Fuchs (2009) 
which examines the privatisation of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to the South African 
bank Stanbic, shows that these elements of best practice also apply when the banking 
sector is concentrated and under-developed.  The government fully relinquished control 
to a strategic investor in an open sales process that allowed foreign participation and the 
authors found that profitability improved post-privatisation with no evidence that 
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outreach declined. Similar impact of privatisation to a foreign bank has been found in the 
case study of the privatisation of Tanzania’s national bank of commerce to the Dutch 
Rabobank (Cull and Spreng, 2011). 
The telecommunications sector 
One of the first telecom studies focused on developing countries by Wallsten (2001) used 
a panel of 30 African and Latin American countries from 1984-1997 with a methodology 
similar to MNR. Overall, the author finds that competition is significantly associated with 
increases in per capita access and decreases in costs. However, privatisation alone is 
associated with few benefits, and is negatively correlated with connection capacity. In 
addition, privatisation only improves performance when coupled with effective and 
independent regulation and increases in competition. 
More recently, Gasmi, Maingard, Noumba and Recuero-Virto (2012) have examined the 
impact of privatisation of the fixed-line telecommunications operator on sector 
performance, analysing the outcomes of privatisation reforms in a 1985–2007 panel 
dataset on a selection of 108 countries (OECD, Asia, Africa, Latin America). They find 
that the impact of privatisation on sector outcomes (fixed-line deployment, cellular 
deployment, labour efficiency, price of fixed-line) was positive in the OECD, Central 
America and the Caribbean and in resource-scarce coastal Africa and Asia. However, it 
was negative in South America and in African resource-scarce landlocked countries and 
no significance was identified in resource-rich African countries. 
Gasmi et al. (2012) note that countries with successful privatisations have developed 
their infrastructure through the creation of appropriate institutional structures which 
have improved the effectiveness of infrastructure policies and that the coverage of 
networks increased thanks to the additional capital available with privatisation. In 
contrast, privatisation outcomes proved to be poor in South America, in African 
resource-scarce landlocked and African resource-rich countries, due to weak contractual 
design and inadequate enforcement of policies in the infrastructure sector, as well as 
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insufficient aggregate demand. In the absence of strong state capacity, competition 
appeared to be a more effective instrument to foster performance than privatisation.  
The extent of infrastructure privatisation also diverged across regions. While almost all 
OECD countries have privatised their telecommunications utilities, the rate of 
privatisation is only around 70% in Latin American, Asian, and African resource-scarce 
coastal countries. In African resource-scarce landlocked and resource-rich countries, the 
percentage of privatised infrastructure in telecommunications is even lower, at around 
40% and 30% respectively. Overall, the study by Gasmi et al. (2012) shows that there 
were limited privatisation effects on network expansion and that productive efficiency did 
not increase in all the regions post-privatisation. As such, the authors conclude that 
there is no unique model of reform for infrastructure sectors.  
The utilities sector 
Turning to water privatisation, Estache and Rossi (2002) estimate a stochastic cost 
frontier using 1995 data from a sample of 50 water companies in 29 Asian and Pacific 
countries. They find that efficiency is not significantly different in private and public 
companies. Kirkpatrick, Parker, and Zhang (2006) use a questionnaire survey on water 
utilities in Africa, covering 13 countries and 14 utilities that reported private sector 
involvement, and undertake data envelopment analysis and stochastic cost frontier 
techniques. They do not find strong evidence of performance differences between state-
owned water utilities and water utilities involving some private capital. The authors 
consider that this result is related to the technology of water provision; the costs of 
organizing long-term concession agreements; and regulatory weaknesses. In particular, 
they argue that the nature of the productxiii severely restricts the potential for 
competition and therefore the efficiency gains. This means rivalry under privatisation 
must derive from the form of competition for the market—competition to win the 
contract or concession agreement. But, as the authors explain, transaction costs can be 
high in the process of contracting for water services provision; for example, the costs of 
organizing the bidding process, monitoring contract performance, and enforcing contract 
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terms where failures are suspected. The importance of transparent competition for the 
market to achieve efficiency gains and prevent the grabbing of assets by political cronies 
was also evidenced by a more recent research by Tan (2012) in the context of private 
participation in infrastructure (PPI) in water in Malaysia. He shows that the efficiency 
gains of water privatisation (measured by water loss and unit costs) were inconclusive 
over the period 2001-2008. Despite this, and the subsequent renationalization of water 
assets, PPI continues to be promoted –being recast in the form of management 
contracts- because it provides captive rents. This is also evidenced in the “cherry-
picking” of segments and areas for privatisation: private sector participation is 
concentrated in the more lucrative water treatment segment and higher income states, 
leaving the less profitable segments and (more rural) areas to the public sector. 
In terms of privatisation of electricity, the study of Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2008) 
provides an econometric assessment using panel data for 36 developing and transition 
countries, over the period 1985-2003. They examine the impact of these reforms on 
generating capacity, electricity generated, labour productivity in the generating sector 
and capacity utilization. They find that, overall, the gains in economic performance from 
privatisation and regulations are limited, while introducing competition is more effective 
to stimulate performance. In particular, they do not find that privatisation leads to 
improved labour productivity or to higher capital utilization, or to more generating 
capacity and higher output, except when it is coupled with the establishment of an 
independent regulator. The authors conclude that when competition is weak, an effective 
regulatory system is needed to stimulate performance, while regulation of state-owned 
enterprises without privatisation is ineffective.  
A more recent study by Balza, Jimenez and Mercado (2013) examines the relationship 
between private sector participation, institutional reform, and performance of the 
electricity sector in 18 Latin American countries over the last four decades (1971-2010) 
This also finds that, regardless of the level of private participation, well-designed and 
stable sectoral institutions are essential for improving the performance of the electricity 
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sector. In particular, privatisation is robustly associated with improvements in quality 
and efficiency, but not with accessibility to the service. In contrast, regulatory quality is 
strongly associated with better performance in terms of both quality and accessibility. 
 
Table 1: Methodology and classifications of empirical papers. 
Authors Method Data Results Category 
Banks 
Azam, Biais 
and Dia 
(2004) 
Measures of performance: log of 
bank net profits/total loans and 
log of ratio of bad loans/total 
loans. Regress the performance of 
banks on the lagged percentage 
of lagged foreign ownership (OLS 
and GLS specifications). 
Africa (Benin, 
Burkina, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo).], 
1990-1997. Small 
sample (49 
observations). 
Positive impact of foreign 
ownership on performance of 
banks, due to more risk-seeking 
strategies by foreign owners. 
II 
Beck, Cull 
and Jerome 
(2005) 
Measures of performance: ROA, 
ROE, NPL. 
MNR Methodology: period of 
eleven years: three years before 
and eight years after privatisation. 
Nigeria. Unbalanced 
sample of 69 banks 
with annual data for 
the period 1990 
through 2001, with a 
total of 576 
observations. 
Performance improvements 
following privatisation, but 
negative effects of the continuing 
minority government ownership 
on the performance of many 
Nigerian banks. 
III 
Beck, 
Crivelli and 
Summerhill, 
2005 
Measures of performance: ROE, 
ROA, overhead costs/assets 
MNR method 
Examines four options: 
liquidation, federalization, 
privatisation and restructuring 
Brazil, unbalanced 
panel of 207 banks 
with quarterly data 
over the period 
January 1995 to 
September 2003, 
with a total of 4,864 
observations. 
Privatised banks increased their 
performance, but not restructured 
banks. 
III 
Bonin, 
Hasan and 
Wachtel, 
2005 
Measures of performance: cost 
and profit efficiency, ROA 
Four ownership types: foreign 
greenfield, domestic de novo, 
state owned, privatised. 
stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) to estimate bank efficiency. 
 
Transition countries 
(Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, 
Hungary, Poland and 
Romania); 67 
different banks from 
1994 to 2002 (451 
observations). 
Foreign-owned banks are most 
efficient and government-owned 
banks are least efficient. Voucher 
privatisation 
does not lead to increased 
efficiency and early-privatised 
banks are more efficient than 
later-privatised banks, (and no 
evidence of selection effect). 
IV 
Boubakri et 
al. (2005) 
Measures of performance: ROE, 
net interest margin, credit risk. 
Examine three categories of 
controlling owners: foreign 
investors, local industrial groups 
and the government itself. 
MNR methodology on a panel of 
banks. 
Period of seven years: three years 
prior to privatisation and three 
years postprivatisation, including 
the year of privatisation itself). 
81 bank 
privatisations 
occurring between 
1986 and 1998, in 
22 low- and middle-
income countries. 
Profitability increases post-
privatisation, but it depends on 
the type of owner (higher 
economic efficiency exhibited by 
banks owned by local industrial 
groups and foreign owners). 
IV 
Otchere 
(2005) 
Measures of performance: 
CAMEL criteria (Capital adequacy, 
Asset quality, Management 
efficiency, Earnings ability and 
Labor 
(employment levels and 
productivity). Stock market data. 
MNR methodology: 3 years pre-
Analyze 21 
privatisations (and 
65 rival banks) from 
middle and low-
income countries. 
Statistically significant 
improvement in operating 
performance for the privatised 
banks in the pre- and 
postprivatisation period, apart 
from reduction in loan loss 
provisions ratio. 
One reason for the lack of 
IV 
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privatisation operating 
performance data and 5 years 
post privatisation.  
Examines pre- and post-
privatisation operating 
performance of the privatised 
banks relative to that of the rival 
banks. 
improvement might be the 
continued government ownership 
of these banks. 
Clarke, Cull 
and Fuchs 
(2009) 
Measures of performance:  
ROA, NPL, total expenses/total 
assets. 
Case study of the privatisation of 
Uganda Commercial Bank to 
Stanbic (South African bank). 
Employ regressions that show the 
evolution of UCB, Stanbic, and the 
post-merger bank in terms of 
profitability, portfolio quality, 
operating efficiency, and credit 
growth. 
 
Uganda, 1996 to 
2005, 555 
observations 
(quarterly data).  
Improvement in profitability and 
rate of credit growth compared to 
pre-privatisation for UCB. 
III 
Cull and 
Spreng 
(2011) 
Measures of performance: ROA, 
NPL. 
Examines the privatisation of 
National Bank of Commerce.	
test whether the privatisation of 
the two successor banks to the 
original National Bank of 
Commerce resulted in 
improved performance. 
42 banks operating 
in Tanzania between 
December 
1998 and December 
2006. 
 
Sale to a foreign strategic investor 
(Rabobank from the Netherlands) 
resulted in improved profitability 
and reductions in non-performing 
loans, along with an increase in 
the ratio of loans to total assets. 
III 
Telecommunications  
Wallsten 
(2001) 
Measures of performance: 
mainline penetration, payphones, 
connection capacity, prices for 
local calls, labour efficiency. 
MNR, includes fixed effects. 
1984-1997; 30 
African and Latin 
American countries. 
Privatisation combined with an 
independent regulator is positively 
correlated with telecom 
performance measures. No clear 
benefits of privatisation alone. 
IV 
Gasmi, 
Maingard, 
Noumba 
and 
Recuero-
Virto 
(2012)  
Measures of performance: 
Mainline penetration 
Cellular subscription, mainlines 
per employee, Monthly 
subscription to fixed, Price of 
cellular  
Empirical analysis of the impact of 
privatisation of the fixed-line 
activity of the traditional 
telecommunications operator on 
output/efficiency/price. 
Fixed-effect and random-effect 
models, DIF-GMM. 
 
1985–2007 panel 
dataset on a 
selection of 108 
countries (OECD, 
Asia, Africa, Latin 
America). 
 
Performance of privatisation 
depends on regional factors 
related to market profitability, 
wealth, and geography 
IV 
Utilities - water  
Estache and 
Rossi 
(2002) 
Stochastic cost frontier 1995; 50 companies; 
29 Asian-Pacific 
countries. 
Efficiency is not significantly 
different in private companies 
than in public ones. 
IV 
Kirkpatrick, 
Parker, 
Zhang 
(2006) 
Stochastic cost frontier 2000; Africa; 76 
observations, 
including 10 
private-sector 
operations. 
No strong evidence of differences 
in the performance of state-owned 
water utilities and water utilities 
involving some private capital in 
Africa. 
IV 
Tan (2012) Measures of performance: 
Nonrevenue water (NRW), unit 
costs, tariffs, water production 
capacity (the amount of water 
1991-2010; 
Malaysia; 13 
Malaysian states. 
No evidence of improvement in 
efficiency and capital investment 
after privatisation. 
I 
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treated for distribution), length of 
pipes.  
Case study (graphs and 
statistics). 
Different ownerships: 
public ownership, corporatized, 
public–private, private 
Utilities - electricity 
Zhang, 
Parker and 
Kirkpatrick 
(2008) 
Measures of performance: net 
electricity generation per 
capita of the population, installed 
generation capacity per capita of 
the population, net electricity 
generation per employee in the 
industry and electricity generation 
to average capacity (capacity 
utilization). 
The privatisation variable used in 
the study was constructed as the 
percentage of generating capacity 
owned by private investors. 
Fixed effects (country and year) 
to deal with endogeneity. 
panel data for 36 
developing and 
transitional 
countries, over the 
period 1985–2003. 
Competition seems to be most 
effective to increase performance. 
On their own privatisation and 
regulation do not lead to 
significant improvement in 
performance. 
 
II 
Balza, 
Jimenez 
and 
Mercado 
(2013) 
Measures of performance: 
real end-user prices for residential 
electricity (excluding taxes); 
percentage of households with 
access to electricity; electricity 
capacity generation; and 
electricity loss as a percentage of 
total electricity production. 
Privatisation measured as the 
cumulative investment in the 
electricity sector as a percentage 
of average gross capital formation 
in the period 1984–2010. 
1971-2012; 18 Latin 
American countries 
(panel of countries). 
Country-level 
analysis. 
Find that countries with higher 
private investment tend to provide 
more efficient and better-quality 
electricity services. 
II 
 
Summary 
To bring together this evidence and evaluate its robustness as a basis for policy, we 
classify the papers reviewed in this section into four categories depending on the quality 
of the sample and the robustness of the methods used: Category I – single country data, 
basic statistics or econometrics (or small sample). Category II – cross-country data, 
basic statistics or econometrics (or small sample). Category III – single country data, 
more advanced econometric techniques. Category IV – cross-country data, advanced 
econometric techniques. The findings are reported in Table 1 and taken together, 
provide qualified evidence that privatisation can improve company performance including 
from studies that use the most advanced econometric methods. 
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Thus, the evidence from empirical studies of privatisation in developing countries 
suggests that the performance of banks improved significantly after privatisation in 
many cases. However, the gains from privatisation in the utilities sector (electricity and 
water) have tended to be limited. Finally, concerning the telecommunications sector, the 
impact of privatisation on efficiency and coverage varies by region. It has been shown to 
be positive in Central America and in resource-scarce coastal Africa and Asia, but 
negative in South America and in African resource-landlocked countries. Thus, the 
impact appears to be context as well as sector-specific. The main factors explaining this 
variation are regulatory quality (and behind that the quality of institutions), 
heterogeneity in effective competition, differences in the detail of contractual design, and 
in the characteristics of the new owners.  
 
Privatisation Process: Distributional impacts 
Thomas Piketty’s recent book (2014), which has highlighted the importance of income 
distribution in the growth process, also discussed the impact of privatisation on capital 
accumulation. In principle, privatisation need not affect the stock of wealth in an 
economy, nor its distribution. State owned firms are public assets which earn a return 
for their owners. Provided the assets to be privatised are valued in such a way that their 
price represents the discounted sum of the profits to be earnt from them, then 
privatisation means that the state is replacing an income stream with its discounted 
capital value in its asset portfolio. At the same time, the private sector is purchasing an 
asset which generates its full value over time from its annual earnings. Hence 
privatisation does not necessarily entail a net transfer of wealth between the public and 
private sector. 
However, the privatisation process has not always followed these principles of public 
finance (Estrin et al, 2009). In the extreme, as in the programs in the Czech Republic or 
Russia, significant state assets were transferred to private hands at nominal or zero 
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prices; in effect a transfer of wealth from the state to the private sector. More generally, 
state assets have frequently been undervalued. This may have been in order to make 
the assets more attractive to the market, or because the SOEs were loss-making and the 
short-term requirement to balance the budget dominated long-term state asset portfolio 
criteria. In some cases, ideological arguments have also played a role; Mrs Thatcher and 
several of her admirers in transition economies viewed privatisation as a policy 
mechanism to broaden the private ownership of shares in companies (Estrin, 2002). 
Whatever the motivation, undervaluation of state assets leads to a net redistribution of 
assets from state to private hands. Piketty argues that this was an important element in 
relatively larger growth of private wealth in Britain than in other Western European 
countries between 1970 and 2010. Furthermore, it was almost certainly a major factor in 
what he describes as the “considerable growth of private wealth in Russia and Eastern 
Europe…. which led in some cases to the spectacularly rapid enrichment of certain 
individuals (I am thinking of the Russian oligarchs)” (2014:187).  
As the quotation from Piketty makes clear, the impact on income distribution of 
privatisation depends on how the ownership of the assets is transferred from state into 
private hands; both the pricing and to whom the SOEs are privatised. In the extreme 
case when assets are transferred by voucher to each citizen equally from the state to 
private hands at a zero or nominal price, as in the Czech Republic, there is a transfer 
from public to private assets equal to the value of the privatised firms but the impact on 
income distribution will be egalitarian because the process transfers shares to all citizens 
equally. In contrast, if assets are freely transferred to a single wealthy individual, the 
impact will be severely to worsen the distribution of income. In practice, state owned 
assets that are transferred at below their market value are often also transferred to 
individuals who are already wealthy, leading to increasing inequality.  
Political factors may play a significant role in this process with corrupt elites seizing for 
themselves state assets, or using them to reward their cronies or political supporters. 
Thus, rather than being to improve efficiency, privatisation may be employed by the 
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ruling group as a mechanism to redistribute wealth and resources.  Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2010) point to the transfer of state assets into the hands of the governing 
elite, often associated with the deliberate continuation of monopoly power, as a 
mechanism of extractive political institutions; they cite the telecommunication 
privatisation in Mexico and the huge wealth accumulated by Carlos Slim ($47 billion, 
2016) as an example.  
But negative distributional effects may also occur for reasons of perceived efficiency 
enhancement, for example because the state believes that particular private individuals 
are those most likely to be able to improve company performance. This implies a trade-
off between efficiency and equity objectives in the privatisation process. Equity is 
supported by processes which engender dispersed ownership while it is usually argued 
that efficiency is driven by concentrated ownership (Estrin, 2002). The empirical 
evidence highlights this trade-off; improvements in the performance of privatised firms 
have been found to depend on the subsequent ownership arrangements (Djankov and 
Murrell, 2002). Notably privatisation to concentrated owners, such as to foreign firms or 
to small groups of strategic owners yields greater improvements in performance than 
privatisation to the general population via share offerings, or to managers and workers 
(Estrin et al., 2009).  
Birdsall and Nellis (2003) place the issue of the distributional impact of privatisation 
more formally into an efficiency/equity framework. The effect of privatisation on income 
distribution between taxpayers and the new owners depends both on the initial price and 
on the post-sale stream of value produced. There is no unambiguous prediction about 
the distributional effects of privatisation, which will instead depend on initial conditions, 
the privatisation process and the post-privatisation political and economic environment. 
Any assessment of the effects should be dynamic and highly country-specific, depending 
on the political and economic context and its history. However, they argue that there is 
scope for efficiency-enhancing privatisation which also promotes equity in developing 
countries.  
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We review below the distributional impacts of privatisations through their effect on 
ownership, employment, prices and their fiscal effects. 
A review of the distributional impacts of privatisations in the last decade 
Ownership. As Megginson (2000) notes, in countries that have privatised through 
asset sales, the process has frequently been non-transparent and plagued by insider 
dealing and corruption. Thus in Russia, the “loans for shares” programs enabled well-
connected financiers to obtain controlling states in the country’s most valuable firms for 
a price well below their true value (Megginson, 2000).  Moreoever, the distributional 
impact of voucher privatisations has also been disappointing; in Russia and the Czech 
Republic, the returns on the vouchers were much lower than anticipated, and very small 
in comparison to what a very few well-connected group of people obtained in the 
privatisation process (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003).  
Employment. Privatisation can also affect the distribution of income through its 
impact on employment. As public enterprises tend to be overstaffed prior to 
privatisation, private ownership can lead to restructuring and consequent 
disproportionate redundancies for specific categories of worker (low-skilled for instance). 
The study by Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002) based on a survey of 308 privatised 
firms (covering 84 countries) over the period 1982-2000 has shown that employment 
was reduced in 78% post-privatization, likely worsening income distribution (Birdsall and 
Nellis, 2003). 
That said, if the newly privatised firm becomes more efficient, total employment might 
recover after the initial restructuring phase. In addition, government-owned firms that 
do not privatise may also have to reduce workforce size. Research by Gupta (2011) on 
privatisation in India covering the 20-year period 1989-2009 shows that privatisation 
increases employment significantly and is not associated with a decline in employee 
compensationxiv. Moreover, she argues that an evaluation of the redistribution of wealth 
from the government to private owners, must also take account of the cost of subsidies 
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to government-owned firms. However, the employment costs of privatisation will be 
borne by specific groups of workers, while the benefits, in terms of reduced subsidies, 
are distributed across taxpayers. Hence privatisation may face opposition from organized 
interests who benefit from maintaining government ownership. 
While Gupta’s (2011) work is a single-country study, it has the merit of using more 
advanced econometric methods to control for dynamic selection bias by applying firm 
fixed effects and comparing privatised firms to a control group of firms that have also 
been selected for privatisation but have not yet been sold. In addition, the share of 
private ownership is introduced with a lag to reduce the possibility of simultaneity 
between privatisation and performance. 
Prices and access. Privatisation can also have different impacts on income groups 
through prices and access to services. First, privatisation can lead to a fall in prices if it is 
accompanied by increased competition. In addition, if private management leads to 
efficiency gains, some of the savings can be passed on to consumers. However, prices 
may increase if they were previously below cost-recovery level. The distributional impact 
depends on how the consumption of the firms’ goods and services varies by income 
levels. Access may increase if the privatised business is expanded through investments 
which could not be undertaken in public ownership.  However private owners may 
decrease their engagement in specific, low return market segments, which may 
disproportionately affect the poor. Price increases are common following privatisation in 
network or infrastructure industries, along with increases in the quality of services. On 
the one hand, subsidised services tend to benefit more the relatively wealthy consumers 
than poorer ones; as such they may be relatively more impacted than the lower-income 
segment by privatisation. On the other hand, price increases following privatisation of 
electricity and water will increase the burden of poorer consumers, especially if it is 
accompanied by the end of illegal water and electricity connections (Birdsall and Nellis, 
2003). 
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Several studies in Latin America have shown that utility privatisation has in fact led to 
network expansion and increased access to the service by the population, especially the 
rural poor [Peru (Torero and Pasco-Font, 2001); Argentina (Chisari, Estache and 
Romero, 1999; Delfino and Casarin, 2001; Ennis and Pinto, 2002); Bolivia (Barja and 
Urquiola, 2001); Mexico (Lopez-Calva and Rosellon, 2002)]. This increased network 
coverage has often been the consequence of market expansion enabled by private 
investment capital (see Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten (2004)).  
When access has increased significantly without a steep rise in prices, privatisation has 
had positive distributional effects (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003). However, increased access 
has been often accompanied by substantial price increases (Estache, Foster and Wodon, 
2002). In addition, an important negative distributional impact has been through the 
elimination of illegal connections to electricity and water networks by lower income 
people. A recent paper by Hailu, Guerreiro-Osorio and Tsukada (2012) on water service 
privatisation in Bolivia in the late 1990s early 2000s, shows how tariff increases required 
for full cost recovery may lead to adverse privatisation outcomes; in this case the 
eventual renationalization of the company. To examine the impact of privatisation on 
access, the authors use a difference-in-difference approach comparing two groups: 
households in cities were the utility was privatised, and households in the other cities, 
with two points in time, before (1996) and after (2001 and 2005) privatisation. They find 
a positive relationship between access to water and living in cities where the water utility 
was privatized. However, the water sector was renationalized in 2006 partly because of 
popular movements against the tariff increases required for full cost recovery and the 
failure of the concessionaire to meet targets stipulated in the contract. 
Finally, Austin, Descisciolo and Samuelsen (2016) point to the limits of privatisation in 
sectors with public goods characteristics. Examining the privatisation of healthcare in 99 
less-developed nations over the 1995-2000 period, they employ two-way fixed effects 
ordinary least squares regression models. The fixed effects allow them to deal with 
unmeasured, time-invariant variables that are excluded from a regression model. They 
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regress tuberculosis prevalence per 100,000 on the log of private health expenditures, 
the log of public health expenditures and a set of controls (economic development, 
education, HIV prevalence and access to water and sanitation). They find that, while 
public health expenditures reduce tuberculosis rates in developing nations over time, this 
is not the case for private health expenditures.  
Fiscal effects. The fiscal effects of privatisation on income distribution are 
indirect and come through changes in revenues and expenditures. In particular, 
privatisation may affect real income (net of taxes) if it reduces the tax burden 
differentially across households, or if it leads to increased access by the poor to 
government services funded by new tax flows. The study of Davis, Ossowski, 
Richardson, and Barnett (2000) on 18 developing and transition countries has shown 
that the net fiscal effects of privatisation were receipts in the order of 1% of GDP. In 
some countries, the main fiscal benefits of privatisation have been to eliminate subsidies. 
Subsidies in critical infrastructure services has often led to the rationing of under-priced 
services, affecting hardly poorer households which often had little or no access to these 
services, while the non-poor enjoyed the under-priced access. To the extent that 
privatisation stops these flows of subsidies, it produces indirect benefits in terms of 
increased retained revenues (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003), which could indirectly benefit the 
poor.  
Table 2: Summary of distributional impacts of privatisation (spillovers) 
Distributional impact Progressive effect Regressive effect 
Ownership If the sale is conducted in a transparent 
way, with a wide distribution of 
vouchers with positive returns. 
If the asset is under-priced and 
rewards political cronyism. If the sale is 
non-transparent. 
Employment If newly privatised firm become more 
efficient and dynamic, total 
employment might recover after the 
initial restructuring phase 
The restructuring and consequent 
disproportionate laid-off of specific 
categories of worker. 
Prices Privatisation can lead to a fall in prices 
if it is accompanied by increased 
competition. In addition, if private 
management leads to efficiency gains, 
some of the savings can be passed on 
to consumers. 
Prices may increase if they were 
previously below cost-recovery level. 
Access Access may increase if the privatised 
business is expanded through 
If the private owner decreases its 
engagement in specific market 
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investments. segments that are beneficial to the 
poor. In addition, poorer consumers 
can see their access reduced if 
privatisation is accompanied by the end 
of illegal water and electricity 
connections. 
Fiscal If it leads to increased access by the 
poor to government services funded by 
new tax flows. 
Privatisation may affect real income 
(net of taxes) if it reduces the tax 
burden differentially across households. 
Privatisation transfers control rights to 
private interests and eliminates public 
subsidies, benefiting taxpayers but 
reducing consumers’ surplus if costs 
are increased. 
 
Policy Implications 
The traditional literature, primarily concerning developed economies, argued that 
privatisation had largely positive effects on the economic and financial performance of 
the companies involved, as well as wider spillover benefits e.g. via technological diffusion 
from foreign ownership of former SOEs and enhanced efficiency from the privatisation of 
utilities and other forms of infrastructure. Moreover, privatisation programs also 
frequently achieved additional objectives including the generation of revenues to relax 
state budget constraints and a broadening of share ownership amongst the population. 
On this basis, privatisation became an important element of reform programs in 
transition and then developing economies from the 1990s. The experience of the past 
twenty years leaves some of these conclusions unchanged, but leads us to a more 
nuanced evaluation of the effects of privatisation in the context of economic 
development. 
In particular, though state sectors are often very large in developing economies, it has 
been hard to establish widespread privatisation programs in many parts of the world, 
partly because of political opposition. This has arisen for a variety of reasons. First, the 
record of privatisation as it spread to middle income and then transition economies 
(including China) was not always so positive as had pertained in developed economies. 
The lesson of the transition economy experience was that privatisation was not always a 
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panacea: if the mode of privatisation was inappropriate or the market environment not 
competitive, privatisation might not enhance the performance of the firms involved 
(Estrin et al., 2009). Moreover, privatisation programs were associated with scandals: 
inappropriate valuations brought in their train the emergence of extreme inequalities of 
wealth. Second, in developing economies where the institutional environment, 
particularly with respect to regulation of monopolies, was sometimes even weaker than 
in transition economies, the benefits of privatisation were even less automatic, 
depending on the sector, and were contingent to a significant degree on the design of 
the privatisation program. Third, distributional issues are especially significant in 
developing economies, so privatisation programs had also to consider distributional 
impacts in ways that had been less relevant for developed economies; opposition rested 
on issues raised by the efficiency-equity trade-off. Finally, political economy issues are 
perhaps of even greater consequence for policy choices in developing economies, and 
privatisation programs are especially open to manipulation by extractive political 
institutions and elites in fragmented political environments.   
This long list of concerns has meant that the spread of privatisation programs to 
developing countries has been limited, both geographically and with respect to sectoral 
reach. The slowdown in privatisation has no doubt been exacerbated by the global 
recession from 2008 and the resulting flight from risk which has particularly affected 
stock markets in developing economies. Moreover, the evidence about the effects of 
such privatisations of economic performance is more nuanced than hitherto.  To be 
successful, a privatisation program needs to align its objectives with its methods of 
privatisation, taking into account the sector in which the company operates and the 
national, institutional and political context.  
Necessary pre-conditions for successful interventions: regulatory agencies 
and managerial incentives 
As Lopez-de-Silanes (2005) notes, good rules and contracts are key for a smooth and 
beneficial privatisation process. However, government restructuring of SOEs prior to 
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their sale is likely to be fraught with political difficulties because officials may try to 
extract private benefits. Although restructuring could increase revenues from the sale, L 
he suggests that restructuring policies do not lead to higher revenues. In addition, 
Lopez-de-Silanes (2005) notes the importance of policies to complement privatisation; in 
particular, the need to set up an appropriate regulatory and institutional framework for 
the post-privatisation period.  
Indeed, several papers have shown how a strong and independent regulatory can help 
address the negative impact of corruption on the privatisation process. Wren-Lewis 
(2013) uses a fixed-effects estimator on a panel of 153 electricity distribution firms 
across 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1995-2007. He regresses 
the log of labour employed on a corruption indicator, independent regular authority 
dummies (including dummies for good and bad regulators), a private ownership 
dummies and interaction terms. He employs firm fixed effects to control for time-
invariant unobservables. Because each firm is present in only one country or province, 
the corruption and regulation terms are estimated based only on changes in these 
variables within countries/provinces. He also includes year fixed effects to take into 
account time effects. He shows that greater corruption is associated with lower firm 
labour productivity but this association is reduced when an independent regulatory 
agency is present. However, because of broader institutional weaknesses, developing 
countries face many challenges in establishing a strong regulator. One limit of this study 
is that there may be important (unobserved) parts of the reform package that also 
impact productivity. As such, it should not be assumed that the (observed) reform will 
have the same impacts elsewhere. 
Gassner and Pushak (2014) have examined the impact that the UK regulatory model has 
had in developing and transition countries, and the extent to which they have 
successfully followed its key features; competition, independence and efficiency of 
service delivery through incentive-based regulation. The authors note that while 
regulatory agencies have spread rapidly, the success of the UK regulatory model has 
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been only partial in middle and low-income countries. They argue that the context of 
developing countries, with below cost-recovery tariffs and continued state-ownership, 
makes it more difficult to establish truly independent regulatory institutions.  
Thus, developing countries face many regulatory challenges. They often start with 
important operational inefficiencies and insufficient revenue generation. In addition, a 
majority of firms in potentially regulated sectors are still publicly-owned, because they 
are not attractive enough for private sector investors and because governments do not 
want to cede control of essential services. In these circumstances, incentive regulation 
for efficiency savings is difficult: given the low tariffs, not enough investment can be 
undertaken to improve service delivery, and without private profit motives there is not a 
strong incentive for managers to bring about efficiency. Under-pricing and poor 
operational performance are serious problems: according to the 2010 Africa 
Infrastructure Report published by the World Bank, the under-pricing of electricity costs 
the sector at least US$2.2bns a year in forgone revenues (0.9% of GDP on average).  
Recently, the concept of hybrid regulatory models has been proposed as a solution to the 
challenges in developing countries (Eberhard, 2007). In hybrid models, regulatory 
contracts and independent regulatory agencies coexist. In a context where the 
institutional capacity is low and/or regulatory commitment is weak, an independent 
regulatory agency is supplemented by contracting out or outsourcing certain regulatory 
functions. An illustration of this is the 20-year water and electricity concession contract 
in Gabon which requires using external experts to monitor the service provider’s 
performance in achieving coverage targets. The experts are paid from dedicated funds 
set aside from the concessionaire’s revenues and produce only nonbinding studies. This 
monitoring mechanism is aimed at strengthening the independence and competence of 
the ministerial department responsible for supervising the contract. Policymakers may 
also obtain regulatory assistance from regional regulators or from other countries 
through twinning arrangements. For example, the Eastern Caribbean 
Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL) serves the member countries of the Organisation 
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of Eastern Caribbean States as a shared regulatory body (Tremolet, Shukla and Venton, 
2004). 
Taking into consideration local management and incentives is also important for a 
successful privatisation. Liu, Sun and Woo (2006) identify the motives of local 
government leaders and the constraints that they face during a privatisation process. 
They conclude that local governments’ motivation to privatise their SOEs depends on 
whether the ownership transfer stimulates sufficiently the growth of local tax revenues 
without sacrificing bureaucrats private control benefits. In addition, Dinc and Gupta 
(2011) in their study of privatisation in India observed that no firm located in the home 
state of the minister in charge is ever privatised, which highlights the importance of local 
political factors in the privatisation process. 
What about remaining SOEs? 
To a certain extent, the recommendations about regulation and managerial incentives 
also apply to remaining SOEs. In fact, Bartel and Harrison (2005) argue that public-
sector inefficiency is due to the softness of budget constraints and the degree of internal 
and external competition. This implies that efficiency gains in SOEs could be achieved by 
reducing or eliminating government financing for public enterprises, and/or increasing 
import competition.  
Regarding agency-type problems, Hsieh and Song (2015) observed that one of the key 
reorganizations of state-owned “corporatized” firms in China was that the parent 
company (the controlling shareholder) of the firm incorporated as Limited Liability 
Corporation was to monitor the firm and be responsible for the compensation of the 
firm’s senior managers. These managers were held accountable for the firm’s bottom 
line, which reduced agency-type problems. The senior executives of the parent company, 
in turn, were directly appointed by the local government or by the Central Organization 
Department of the Communist Party.  
Privatisation to foreign owners 
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Work on transition economies in particular established that when SOEs are privatised to 
foreign investors, the efficiency gains are particularly pronounced. The results on foreign 
ownership do seem, however to be replicated in the developing economy context. Thus 
Du, Harrison and Jefferson (2014) have found that foreign equity participation is 
associated with an improvement in productivity which is greater for SOEs than for non-
SOEs in China’s manufacturing sector, suggesting that foreign firms can play an 
important role in improving SOE performance. The benefits of privatisation via transfer 
to foreign firms have also been observed in the case of banking in Africa (see Clarke et 
al., 2005).  
Part of the reason why foreign ownership improves productivity can be found in the 
relation between foreign ownership and corporate risk-taking. Boubakri, Cosset and 
Saffar (2013) found that foreign (state) ownership is positively (negatively) related to 
corporate risk-taking, and that this relation is stronger in countries with better 
institutions. To the extent that corporate risk taking is an important driver of economic 
growth, privatisation via transfer of ownership to foreign owners should yield important 
economic benefits through a reorganization of prevailing incentive structures and 
changes in the degree of risk aversion. Jaslowitzer, Megginson and Rapp (2016) also 
observe that risk aversion and financial conservatism are one of the reasons why state 
ownership is associated with inefficiency. Using a matched panel of 624 firms they find 
that state ownership curtails firms’ responsiveness to investment opportunities. Despite 
these findings, in some developing countries the sale of state assets to foreigners, with 
overtones of colonial legacies, can be a politically charged subject. 
 
Concluding comments 
Privatisation involves the transfer of productive assets from the state to private hands.  
Such transfers are, by their very nature, politically sensitive and subject to potential 
corruption and abuse. We outline below some important issues that policy makers in a 
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developing country should consider when examining a proposed privatisation. In so 
doing, we assume that the primary purpose of privatisation is to enhance economic 
growth.  
First, policy-makers need to examine and establish the preconditions for success, in 
terms of the business environment for competition, governance and entry. The evidence 
suggests that privatisation has greater benefits on firm performance in stronger business 
environments because the success of the process relies on effective corporate 
governance of the privatised entity as well as effective market competition. Key issues at 
the national and sectoral level include: 
• Depth and liquidity of capital market (particularly important for privatisation via 
IPO); 
• Barriers to new domestic firm entry (formal entry costs, bureaucratic costs, 
possibilities for incumbents to restrict entry by the use of political relationships); 
• Quality of legal system concerning corporate governance for example concerning 
company accounting procedures, rules on minority shareholders etc.;  
• Quality of business support e.g. legal firms, accounting firms, management 
consultants, recruitment firms;  
• Openness to foreign direct investment, both via acquisitions (via privatisation) or 
via greenfield (to create competition), and access to foreign portfolio capital;  
• Depth and competitiveness of managerial market (pool of qualified managers); 
• Strength and effectiveness of competition, and competition agency; 
• Independence of anti-monopoly agency from state. 
The quality and independence of the state’s administrative apparatus is particularly 
important. Privatisation makes considerable demands on the capability of the state, both 
in ensuring that the process is not captured by local elites, and in managing the 
relationship between the government and the firm at arm’s length post-privatisation, 
e.g. via regulation. Successful privatisation requires competent government with low 
levels of corruption.  
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Turning to the privatisation process, there is strong evidence that openness of bidding to 
all, including foreign firms, is a key factor of success. 
 
Policy-makers also need to determine the appropriate privatisation methods. Related to 
this, the pricing of the assets to be privatised are a crucial issue with respect to the 
transfer of assets from public to private hands, and the likely impact on the distribution 
of income and wealth. The chosen methods depend in part on the preconditions noted 
above. Countries with poorly developed capital markets are unlikely to be able to 
privatise through IPOs. The main methods of privatisation, listed on the basis of the 
evidence of the literature in order of likely favourable impact on economic growth and 
development are: 
• Sale to high quality foreign firms; xv 
• Sale on domestic capital market via IPO;  
• Sale to domestic businesses or business groups (trade sale);  
• Sale to existing managers and/or workers;  
• Free distribution of shares to the population (mass privatisation). 
There are obvious trade-offs. Free distribution ensures equality in allocation of assets 
around the population but is likely to lead to weak corporate governance. Sale to foreign 
owners, with appropriate safeguards, can raise company efficiency but may lead to job 
losses. 
Privatisation seeks to improve company efficiency via corporate governance. However, 
as we have seen, there may be a number of side-effects which impact other key policy 
targets and these need to be considered in advance: (1) Social and economic side 
effects. Higher efficiency/profitability may be obtained through lower levels of 
employment, lower wages, reduced public service provision and higher product prices, 
with negative distributional and social effects. (2) Competition side effects, especially if 
the government is concerned to sell to foreigners and/ or to maximise revenues, then 
competition effects may be negative and serious. (3) Global impact. Sale of key assets 
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such as banks or resource companies to foreign firms may restrict the range of domestic 
policy and hinder long term development. (4) Political side effects. Sale of assets to 
elites may concentrate political power and economic wealth into fewer hands. (5) Effects 
on distribution of income. An enhanced focus on profitability of firms may lead to 
increased prices of important products for poor households, as well as reduced pay, 
worse employment conditions and fewer job prospects. (6) Effects on fiscal balance. In 
principle, this should be unchanged because if the asset is priced correctly the price 
should reflect the future expected earnings from the company. In practice, pricing may 
be set low, to achieve distributional targets or to support elites and friends. This would 
worsen the government’s balance sheet. At the same time, the new owners may be 
more productive than the state, and hence raise activity and profits, with a positive 
effect on GDP and on government revenues. 
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i Kikeri and Nellis (2004) have also conducted a wide-ranging assessment of privatisation. 
ii Each of these three regions representing between 3%-5% of total world privatisation proceeds over the 1988-
2008 period. 
iii The privatisation barometer database provides world aggregate data on privatisation and a country-
breakdown for developed countries. We are not aware of an alternative database providing such information. 
This was also confirmed by several academic and practitioner experts on privatisation whom we contacted 
during the course of this research. 
iv Which includes transportation, water and sewerage, telecommunications, natural gas transmission and 
distribution, and electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. 
v Which includes agribusiness, cement, chemicals, construction, steel, hotels, tourism, airlines, maritime 
services and other sub-sectors that are not infrastructure or finance related. 
vi Which includes banks, insurance, real estate, and other financial services. 
vii Which includes the exploration, extraction, and refinement of hydrocarbons, oil, and natural gas. 
viii Which includes the extraction, refinement and sale of primary minerals and metals such as coal and iron ore. 
ixThe ownership pattern resulting from privatisation often depends on the mode of privatisation chosen. Thus, 
private sale usually leads to concentrated strategic owners while mass privatisation usually generates 
widespread ownership at least initially. The impact of mode of privatisation on national economic performance 
in transition economies is explored in Bennett, Estrin and Urga (2007). 
x Note however that in the utilities sector, water in particular, the technology and the nature of the product 
restrict the possibility of competition in the market and therefore the efficiency gains following privatisation. In 
this case, competition for the market (to win the contract or concession agreement) has to be organized. Given 
the ambiguous results of privatisation in noncompetitive markets in terms of improving economic performance 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001), regulation may prove to be more effective (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006). 
xi Because the performance of privatised banks in the seven countries of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union from 1990 to 1997 improved in the first year after privatisation but not after that. 
xii Improvements in performance in Nigeria were observed in fully divested banks but not in the ones where the 
government retained minority shareholdings. 
xiii Whereas competition is feasible in telecommunications markets, it is usually cost inefficient in the market for 
water services given the scale of the investment in network assets required to deliver the product. 
xiv Privatisation is also not associated with the profitability and efficiency of government-owned firms. 
xv Note however that this method may suffer from a trade-off with competition objectives since foreign firms 
may seek local monopoly power. Such sales may be accompanied by conditions with respect to technology 
transfer, domestic content of inputs, employment, environment etc. 
 
